Durand and Ugarte v. Peru by Schneeweis, Justine
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2014
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru
Justine Schneeweis
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
This IACHR Summary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Justine Schneeweis, Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, 36 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 173 (2014).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol36/iss1/7
 
173	  
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru 
ABSTRACT1 
This is one of the many cases stemming from the Peruvian government’s 
fight, during the 1980s and 1990s, against the guerilla organization 
Sendero Luminoso. In this case, Peruvian authorities arbitrarily 
arrested and incarcerated Mr. Nolberto Durand Ugarte and his uncle, 
Mr. Gabriel Pablo Ugarte Rivera in the El Frontón Island prison off the 
Peruvian coast. Mr. Durand Ugarte and Mr. Ugarte Rivera were both 
killed during a prison riot by use of excessive force by Peruvian armed 
forces. The remains of one of the two victims were found eighteen years 
later, after the Court issued its judgment, and those of the second victim 
are still missing.   
I. FACTS 
A. Chronology of Events 
February 14, 1986: Peru’s Department Against Terrorism (Dirección 
Contra el Terrorismo, “DIRCOTE”) detains Mr. Nolberto Durand 
Ugarte under suspicion that he participated in terrorist acts.2  
 
February 15, 1986: DIRCOTE detains Mr. Durand Ugarte’s uncle, 
Mr. Gabriel Pablo Ugarte Rivera, for the same reason.3 DIRCOTE 
detains them without arrest warrants or finding them guilty of felonies.4 
DIRCOTE forces Mr. Ugarte Rivera to relinquish his right to a defense 
attorney.5 Police investigate Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte.6 
 
February 25-26, 1986: Ms. Virginia Ugarte Rivera, mother of 
Mr. Durand Ugarte and sister of Mr. Ugarte Rivera, files habeas corpus 
petitions for each relative with the Forty-Sixth Instruction Judicial Court 
 
	   1.	   Justine	   Schneeweis,	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   Elise	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   2.	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  Ugarte	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of Lima.7 In the petition, Ms. Ugarte Rivera asks for access to defense 
attorneys for her detained relatives, the protection of their physical 
integrity, and their immediate release.8 
 
March 4, 1986: Criminal proceedings commence against Mr. Ugarte 
Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte before the Thirty-Ninth Instruction 
Court of Lima.9 Mr. Durand Ugarte and Mr. Ugarte Rivera are sent to 
the El Frontón Island prison off the Peruvian coast.10 
 
June 2, 1986: President of the Republic of Peru, Mr. Alan Gabriel 
Ludwig García Pérez, declares a State of Emergency in the Lima and 
Callao provinces.11 The President’s Order declares that the Armed 
Forces will take control over these provinces, including the prisons.12 
 
June 18, 1986: Simultaneous prisoner uprisings take place at three 
separate prisons in Lima: Santa Bárbara, Lurigancho, and El Frontón, 
where Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte are held.13 Prisoners 
take some of the members of the Republican Guard, the entity 
responsible for enforcing prison security, hostage and confiscate 
Republican Guard weapons.14 Prison authorities, judicial authorities, 
and the rioting prisoners enter negotiations.15 
 
June 19, 1986: President García Pérez issues a Supreme Order 
declaring the Santa Bárbara, Lurigancho, and El Frontón prisons 
“restricted military zones.”16 The Joint Command of the Armed Forces 
takes jurisdiction over El Frontón.17 This jurisdictional status prohibits 
civilian or judicial authorities from entering El Frontón.18 The Peruvian 
Navy and the Republican Guard, under Joint Command as the Special 
Operation Task Force (Fuerza de Operaciones Especiales, “FOES”), 
have control over El Frontón and suppress the prisoner riots.19 
 
	   7.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(e).	  	  
	   8.	   Id.	  	  
	   9.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(d).	  	  
	   10.	   Id.	  	  
	   11.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(q).	  	  
	   12.	   Id.	  	  
	   13.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(f).	  	  
	   14.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(g).	  	  
	   15.	   Id.	  
	   16.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(i).	  	  
	   17.	   Id.	  	  
	   18.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  59(i)-­‐62(b).	  	  
	   19.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(j).	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FOES bombs the Blue Pavilion, an isolated section of El Frontón.20 
The riot suppression efforts exert force that clearly outweighs the force 
exerted by the rioters themselves.21 A significant number of prisoners 
are wounded or killed.22 Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte go 
missing.23 
Because El Frontón is in a restricted military zone that prohibits 
civil judges from entering the prison, habeas corpus recourses are 
effectively impossible.24 The Supreme Order stipulations prevent the 
investigation and thus determination of the whereabouts of habeas 
corpus beneficiaries.25 
 
June 20, 1986: The President’s Supreme Order placing the Santa 
Bárbara, Lurigancho, and El Frontón prisons under military jurisdiction 
appears in a newspaper article.26 The article states that the Order is in 
force as of June 19, 1986 despite the fact that the prison riots are under 
control, and states that military forces have discontinued their operation 
inside the prisons.27 
 
June 26, 1986: Ms. Ugarte Rivera files a habeas corpus petition with 
the First Instruction Judicial Court of Callao on behalf of Mr. Durand 
Ugarte and Mr. Ugarte Rivera.28 She asks the Court to identify the 
location of her relatives, and asks the Court to respect her relatives’ 
right to communicate with those outside the prison, as well as their 
rights to life and personal integrity.29  
 
June 27, 1986: The First Instruction Court of Callao declares that the 
habeas corpus recourse is unfounded.30 
 
July 15, 1986: The First Correctional Tribunal of the Supreme Court of 
Callao confirms the judgment of the First Instruction Court,31 which 
 
	   20.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  59(j),	  38(a).	  	  
	   21.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(j)	  
	   22.	   Id.	  	  
	   23.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(r).	  	  
	   24.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(i).	  	  
	   25.	   Id.	  	  
	   26.	   Id.	  	  
	   27.	   Id.	  	  
	   28.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(o).	  	  
	   29.	   Id.	  	  
	   30.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(p)(i).	  	  
	   31.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(p)(ii).	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held that Ms. Virginia Ugarte’s habeas corpus recourse was 
unfounded.32 
 
August 13, 1986: The First Penal Hall of the Supreme Court confirms 
the Correctional Tribunal’s confirmation of the First Instruction Court’s 
June 27, 1986 verdict.33 
 
August 27, 1986: The Supreme Court declares the military court is 
responsible for investigating the June 19, 1986 riot suppression efforts 
at El Frontón.34 The Second Navy Permanent Instruction Court opens 
proceedings against the Navy Officers who suppressed the El Frontón 
riots.35 
 
October 28, 1986: The Constitutional Guarantees Tribunal affirms the 
Supreme Court’s August 13, 1986 decision that Ms. Ugarte Rivera’s 
habeas corpus recourse is unfounded, but decides that she may reinstate 
the action.36  
 
June 20, 1986 – March 31, 1987: The State removes debris that 
resulted from the June 19, 1986 El Frontón riot in order to investigate 
that event.37 
 
June 6, 1987: The Second Navy Permanent Instruction Court acquits 
the Navy Officers who suppressed the El Frontón riots.38 
 
June 16, 1987: The Permanent Council of the Navy confirms the 
Second Navy Permanent Instruction Court’s acquittal.39 
 
July 31, 1987: La Republica newspaper publishes an article stating that 
the Tribunal for Military Justice declared Mr. Ugarte Rivera and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte free from imprisonment at El Frontón, though both 
men have been missing since the June 19, 1986 El Frontón riots.40  
 
 
	   32.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(p)(i).	  	  
	   33.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(p)(iii).	  	  
	   34.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(k).	  	  
	   35.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(l).	  	  	  
	   36.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(p)(iv).	  	  
	   37.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(ll);	  see	  id.	  ¶	  59(l).	  
	   38.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(l).	  	  
	   39.	   Id.	  	  
	   40.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(r),	  n.33.	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August 7, 1987: The National Congress of Peru establishes a 
commission to investigate the uprisings at the El Frontón, Lurigancho, 
and Santa Bárbara prisons.41  
 
July 20, 1989: The Supreme Council of Military Justice, which had 
reopened the proceedings on the Navy Officers’ liability in their riot 
suppressing efforts, holds that the officers who suppressed the El 
Frontón riots are not responsible for prisoner deaths that occurred 
during the riot suppression efforts.42 
The Council concludes that 111 prisoners died during the riot 
suppression efforts, based on the discovery of ninety-seven corpses and 
fourteen human skeletons.43 As thirty-four prisoners surrendered and 
survived, the Council accounts for a total of 145 people.44 An unofficial 
list of inmates before the riots had included 152 people.45  Thus, the 
Council fails to account for seven inmates.46 
The Council finds that the State did not diligently identify corpses 
after the riots subdued.47 Investigators never requested assistance from 
victims’ families to identify corpses.48 As a result, the corpses of ninety 
human beings went unidentified after autopsies were performed.49  
Mr. Durand Ugarte and Mr. Pablo Ugarte Rivera are not among 
the list of survivors, and their corpses are never identified.50 
B. Other Relevant Facts 
Persistent economic and social inequality plagues the State during 
the 1980s.51 As a result, many segments of the population develop 
increased contempt for the government.52 The Maoist-inspired Shining 
Path (“Sendero Luminoso”) guerilla group, which seeks to overthrow 
the State government, broadens its reach from the impoverished rural 
countryside to urban centers.53 The group conducts armed attacks on 
 
	   41.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(n).	  	  
	   42.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(l).	  	  
	   43.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(ll).	  	  
	   44.	   Id.	  	  
	   45.	   Id.	  	  
	   46.	   See	  id.	  	  
	   47.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(m).	  	  
	   48.	   Id.	  	  
	   49.	   Id.	  ¶	  59(m).	  	  
	   50.	   Id.	  	  
	   51.	   GORDON	   H.	   MCCORMICK,	   RAND	   CORPORATION,	   THE	   SHINING	   PATH	   AND	   THE	   FUTURE	   OF	  
PERU	  1	  (1990).	  	  
	   52.	   See	  id.	  at	  v.	  
	   53.	   See	  id.	  at	  1,	  3.	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polling places, public development projects, police stations, government 
offices, and public infrastructure, among other symbols of government 
power.54 The State government faces an internal crisis with the Shining 
Path’s expanding geographical reach and surge of supporters throughout 
the decade.55 In efforts to quell the Shining Path’s rising influence, the 
State military employs various counterinsurgency strategies, leaving 
scores of human rights abuses in its track.56 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Before the Commission 
April 27, 1987: A petition is brought to the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights on behalf of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand 
Ugarte.57 
 
May 19, 1987: The Commission sends to the State the petition’s 
accusations, and requests that the State send to the Commission 
information as to the extent to which domestic legal recourses had been 
exhausted for those accusations.58  
 
January 19, 1988: The Commission again requests the State to send 
information on exhaustion of domestic legal recourses with regard to 
the petitions on behalf of Mr. Ugarte River and Mr. Durand Ugarte.59 
 
February 23, 1989: The Commission again requests the same 
information from the State.60 
 
September 29, 1989: The State submits a brief to the Commission 
stating that the petitioners have not exhausted all domestic legal 
remedies because there are two cases pending in the State’s Military 
 
	   54.	   Id.	  at	  15-­‐16.	  	  
	   55.	   Id.	  at	  1,	  17.	  	  
	   56.	   Although	   the	   State	   arrested	   Mr.	   Durand	   Ugarte	   and	   Mr.	   Ugarte	   Rivera	   under	  
suspicion	  of	   terrorist	  acts	  during	  the	  Shining	  Path’s	  period	  of	  rising	  power	  and	  the	  State’s	  
counterinsurgency	   policy	   phase,	   neither	   the	   Court	   nor	   the	   State	   implicates	   Mr.	   Durand	  
Ugarte	   or	  Mr.	   Ugarte	   Rivera	  with	   the	   Shining	   Path.	   Durand	   and	  Ugarte	   v.	   Peru,	  Merits,	   ¶	  
59(a);	  see	  MCCORMICK,	  THE	  SHINING	  PATH	  AND	  THE	  FUTURE	  OF	  PERU	  at	  16;	  see	  generally	  Durand	  
and	  Ugarte	  v.	  Peru,	  Merits.	  When	  requested	  to	  do	  so	  by	  the	  Court,	   the	  State	   failed	  to	  offer	  
any	  specific	  terrorist	  allegations	  against	  the	  victims.	  Id.	  ¶	  87.	  	  
	   57.	   Durand	  and	  Ugarte	  v.	  Peru,	  Merits,	  ¶	  3.	  	  
	   58.	   Id.	  	  
	   59.	   Id.	  ¶	  4.	  
	   60.	   Id.	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Exclusive Court that relate to the accusations contained within the 
Commission’s petition.61  
 
June 7, 1990: The Commission again asks the State for the status of 
domestic legal resources exhausted with regard to Mr. Ugarte Rivera 
and Mr. Durand Ugarte, the status of the related cases in the Military 
Exclusive Court, and the whereabouts of Mr. Ugarte River and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte.62 The State does not respond to this request.63 
 
March 5, 1996: The Commission adopts Report No. 15/96, declaring 
the petition admissible.64 
 
May 8, 1996: The Commission sends a copy of the approved petition to 
the State.65 
The Commission finds that the State violated Articles 1(1) 
(Obligation to Respect Rights), 2 (Obligation to Give Domestic Legal 
Effects to Rights), 4 (Right to Life), 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), 7 
(Right to Personal Liberty), 8(1) (Right to a Hearing Within a 
Reasonable Time Before a Competent and Independent Tribunal), 25(1) 
(Right of Recourse Before a Competent Court), 27(2) (Suspension of 
Guarantees) of the American Convention to the detriment of Mr. Ugarte 
Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte.66 
The Commission recommends that the State pay sufficient 
compensation to the relatives of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand 
Ugarte.67 
The Commission requires the State to notify the Commission of 
measures the State will take to adhere to the Commission’s 
recommendations within sixty days of receiving the Commission’s 
report.68 
 
July 5, 1996: The State sends a report to the Commission that 
demonstrates that the State did not comply with the Commission’s 
recommendation.69 
 
	   61.	   Id.	  ¶	  5.	  
	   62.	   Id.	  ¶	  6.	  
	   63.	   Id.	  	  
	   64.	   Id.	  ¶	  7.	  The	  Commission	  did	  not	  publish	  Report	  No.	  15/96.	  
	   65.	   Id.	  	  
	   66.	   Id.	  ¶	  1.	  
	   67.	   Id.	  	  
	   68.	   Id.	  ¶	  7.	  	  
	   69.	   Id.	  ¶	  8.	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B. Before the Court 
August 8, 1996: The Commission submits the case to the Court after the 
State fails to adopt its recommendations.70 
 
September 20, 1996: The State submits seven preliminary objections 
with the Court.71 
The State first argues that the claimants have failed to exhaust 
domestic remedies pursuant to Article 46 of the American Convention 
and Articles 44 and 45 of the Commission’s regulations.72 The State 
notes that the claimants did not seek a civil action pursuant to the 
State’s Civil Code to declare Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte 
deceased for inheritance purposes.73 The State further notes that the 
claimants failed to exhaust possible recourse under habeas corpus.74 
Second, the State claims that the Commission already decided this 
case in its decision in Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru, which shared the 
same facts of the present case.75 The Commission, however, failed to 
combine the two petitions as provided in Article 40.2 of the 
Commission Regulations.76 
Third, the State claims that this case is precluded by res judicata 
because the Court already delivered judgment in Neira Alegría et al. v. 
Peru.77 
Fourth, the State claims that claimants failed to indicate in their 
original petition which domestic remedies they pursued, and that the 
petition, which the Commission received on April 27, 1987 and 
concerned events that occurred on June 18, 1986, was not brought 
within the applicable time frame set forth in Article 38 of the 
Commission Regulations.78 
Fifth, the State claims that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the 
case.79 The State argues that the purpose, competence, and jurisdiction 
of the Court are debased because the claimants seek compensatory 
damages without an intervening proceeding wherein the Court finds the 
 
	   70.	   Id.	  ¶	  9.	  	  
	   71.	   Durand	   and	   Ugarte,	   Preliminary	   Objections,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	  
No.	  50,	  ¶	  15	  (May	  28,	  1999).	  	  
	   72.	   Id.	  ¶	  30.	  	  
	   73.	   Id.	  ¶	  31(b).	  	  
	   74.	   Id.	  	  
	   75.	   Id.	  ¶	  41.	  	  
	   76.	   Id.	  	  
	   77.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  45-­‐46.	  	  
	   78.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  56(a)-­‐(b).	  	  
	   79.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  51(a)-­‐(b).	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State’s breach of its human rights commitment in a case with new facts 
that has not been adjudicated. 80 The State also claims that the Court is 
biased because it is unlikely to depart from its prior ruling on a case 
with nearly identical facts.81 
Sixth, the State argues procedural error, lack of competence, and 
lack of standing by the Commission.82 The State contends that the 
Commission omitted the friendly settlement procedure and duplicated a 
previously examined petition.83 
Seventh, the State claims the Commission lacked standing to issue 
a report on the claimants’ petition, arguing that the Commission cannot 
adopt a report on a matter in which it previously served as a party 
before the Court or decide a case that was already settled by the Court.84 
 
October 4, 1996: The State appoints Mr. Fernando Vidal Ramírez as 
judge ad hoc.85 
 
May 28, 1999: The Court issues a judgment on the State’s preliminary 
objections.86 
The Court dismisses the State’s first preliminary objection.87 The 
Court finds that the claimants sufficiently exhausted domestic remedies 
pursuant to Article 46(1) of the American Convention where it 
exhausted the habeas corpus remedy.88 Since habeas corpus is the 
appropriate remedy in cases of forced disappearances, it was the only 
remedy that the claimants were required to exhaust.89  
The Court notes that the habeas corpus remedy was pursued on 
two occasions: Ms. Ugarte Rivera’s habeas corpus petitions on behalf 
of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte with Lima’s Forty-sixth 
Examining Court on February 25 and 26, 1986, and Ms. Ugarte 
Rivera’s second habeas corpus filing with Callao’s First Examining 
Court on June 26, 1986.90 The second petition was made subsequent to 
 
	   80.	   Id.	  ¶	  51(a).	  	  
	   81.	   Id.	  ¶	  51(b).	  
	   82.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  62(a),	  62(d).	  	  
	   83.	   Id.	  ¶	  62(a).	  
	   84.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  67-­‐68.	  	  
	   85.	   Durand	  and	  Ugarte	  v.	  Peru,	  Merits,	  ¶	  12.	  	  
	   86.	   Durand	  and	  Ugarte	  v.	  Peru,	  Preliminary	  Objections,	  ¶	  29.	  	  
	   87.	   Id.	  ¶	  39.	  	  
	   88.	   Id.	  ¶	  32(a).	  	  
	   89.	   Id.	  ¶	  32(c).	  	  
	   90.	   Id.	  ¶	  36(a).	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the June 18th prison rights,91 and was denied and affirmed denied on 
appeal.92 The Court notes that the habeas corpus remedy is considered 
exhausted when it is pursued and decided without satisfactory result to 
the claimant.93 Thus, the Court concludes that the claimants exhausted 
domestic remedies pursuant to Article 46(1)(a) of the American 
Convention.94 Regardless, however, the State did not fulfill the 
Commission’s request to demonstrate that the claimants had not 
exhausted local remedies within the period requested by the 
Commission and the State did not properly argue domestic remedy 
exhaustion as a preliminary objection.95 The Court thus dismisses the 
State’s objection.96 
The Court dismisses the State’s second preliminary objection,97 
noting that the Commission must only combine petitions when two 
petitions concern the same facts and persons.98 Because Neira Alegría et 
al. v. Peru and the instant case involve petitions on behalf of separate 
individuals whose rights violations happen to arise from the same facts, 
the Commission was not required to merge the two.99 
The Court dismisses the State’s third preliminary objection of res 
judicata.100  Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte are separate 
human beings from the Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru victims. 101 
Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte received no remedy for their 
rights’ violations in the Neira Alegría case, and accordingly, the 
claimants are not precluded from doing so on behalf of Mr. Ugarte 
Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte with this Court.102 
The Court dismisses the State’s fourth objection.103 Because the 
State was aware that Ms. Ugarte Rivera had filed a habeas corpus 
petition with Callao’s First Examining Court,104 it cannot claim that it 
was unaware of the domestic remedies being pursued.105 The Court also 
 
	   91.	   Id.	  ¶	  37.	  	  
	   92.	   Id.	  	  
	   93.	   Id.	  ¶	  32(c).	  	  
	   94.	   Id.	  ¶	  37.	  	  
	   95.	   Id.	  ¶	  38.	  	  
	   96.	   Id.	  	  
	   97.	   Id.	  ¶	  44.	  	  
	   98.	   Id.	  ¶	  43.	  	  
	   99.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  42-­‐43.	  	  
	   100.	   Id.	  ¶	  49.	  	  
	   101.	   Id.	  	  
	   102.	   Id.	  	  
	   103.	   Id.	  ¶	  60.	  	  
	   104.	   Id.	  ¶	  57(a).	  	  
	   105.	   Id.	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notes that Ms. Ugarte Rivera filed habeas corpus petitions that were 
denied initially and on appeal in higher courts, following proper 
procedures before bringing a petition to the Commission.106 Ms. Ugarte 
Rivera thus exhausted domestic remedies on October 28, 1986 upon the 
Court of Last Resort’s denial of the habeas corpus petition.107  
The Court dismisses the State’s fifth preliminary objection, 
asserting that the filing of the present case, which seeks compensatory 
damages, does not undermine the Court’s purpose, competence, or 
jurisdiction.108 The Court also notes that while the present case contains 
similar facts to that of a case previously adjudicated by the Court, the 
Court’s objectivity and discretion in the present case are not swayed by 
similar cases it previously adjudicated.109 
The Court dismisses the State’s sixth objection, repeating its 
earlier emphasis that the present case is not identical to a prior 
proceeding with similar facts, and noting that the friendly settlement 
procedure is discretionary, not mandatory.110 
The Court dismisses the State’s seventh objection.111 The Court 
refers to the same reasons the Court gave to the State’s second, third, 
and sixth objections.112 
1. Violations Alleged by Commission113 
Article 4 (Right to Life) 
Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment) 
Article 7(6) (Right to Recourse Before a Competent Court) 
Article 8(1) (Right to a Hearing Within a Reasonable Time Before a 
Competent and Independent Tribunal) 
Article 25(1) (Right of Recourse Before a Competent Court) 
Article 27(2) (Suspension of Guarantees) 
all in relation to: 
Article 1(1) (Obligation to Respect Rights) 
Article 2 (Obligation to Give Domestic Legal Effects to Rights) of the 
American Convention. 
 
	   106.	   Id.	  	  
	   107.	   Id.	  	  
	   108.	   Id.	  ¶	  54.	  	  
	   109.	   Id.	  ¶	  52.	  	  
	   110.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  63-­‐66.	  	  
	   111.	   Id.	  ¶	  71.	  	  
	   112.	   Id.	  ¶	  70.	  	  
	   113.	   Durand	  and	  Ugarte	  v.	  Peru,	  Merits,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  68,	  ¶	  1	  
(Aug.	  16,	  2000).	  The	  Commission	  did	  not	   indicate	  that	  these	  violations	  were	  in	  relation	  to	  
Article	  1(1)	  (Obligation	  to	  Respect	  Rights)	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
184	   Loy.	  L.A.	  Int’l	  &	  Comp.	  L.	  Rev.	   [Vol.	  36:173	  
 
2. Violations Alleged by Representatives of the Victims114 
Same Violations Alleged by the Commission. 
III. MERITS 
A. Composition of the Court 
Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, President 
Máximo Pacheco Gómez, Vice-President 
Hernán Salgado Pesantes, Judge 
Alirio Abreu Burelli, Judge 
Sergio García Ramírez, Judge 
Carlos Vicente de Roux Rengifo, Judge and 
Fernando Vidal Ramírez, Judge ad hoc 
Manuel E. Ventura Robles, Secretary 
Renzo Porni, Deputy Secretary 
B. Decision on the Merits 
August 16, 2000: The Court issues its Judgment on Merits. 
 
The Court found unanimously that Peru had violated: 
 
 Article 4(1) (Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life), to the 
detriment of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte,115 because:  
 
The State arbitrarily ended the lives of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte.116 The Blue Pavilion detainees at El Frontón were 
convicted or suspected terrorists and used force against the State in the 
form of prisoner riots.117 While the State possesses the right and duty to 
take measures to preserve its own security, it may not abuse this right 
and duty by using force in limitless circumstances.118 The State, 
accordingly, may not arbitrarily deprive an individual of his right to life 
by exerting unjustified and disproportionate force.119 
 
 
	   114.	   See	   generally	   id.	   The	  Court’s	   Judgment	   on	   the	  Merits	   did	  not	   identify	   the	   victims’	  
representatives	  or	  separate	  violations	  alleged	  by	  the	  victims.	  
	   115.	   Id.	  ¶	  72.	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  indicate	  that	  this	  violation	  was	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  1(1)	  
(Obligation	  to	  Respect	  Rights)	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
	   116.	   Id.	  ¶	  71.	  	  
	   117.	   Id.	  ¶	  70.	  	  
	   118.	   Id.	  ¶	  69.	  	  
	   119.	   Id.	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The Court found that the State did not comply with its obligations under 
Article 4(1) (Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life) for several 
reasons.120 First, the State’s Navy forces, in its riot suppression efforts, 
used disproportionate force against the prisoner riots by demolishing 
the Blue Pavilion section of the El Frontón prison, where Mr. Ugarte 
Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte were detained.121 While these prisoners 
exerted force by rioting inside the prison, the Navy unjustifiably 
responded with disproportionate force by bombing the Blue Pavilion.122 
Second, the State’s Navy forces did not attempt to rescue detainees who 
survived the bombing.123 Third, investigative authorities did not 
diligently identify remaining corpses.124 Thus, the State failed to confer 
the protection of life as required by law for Mr. Ugarte Rivera and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte and arbitrarily deprived them of life in violation of 
Article 4(1) (Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life).125 
 
Articles 7(1) (Right to Personal Liberty and Security) and Article 
7(5) (Right to Be Promptly Brought Before a Judge and Right to a Trial 
Within Reasonable Time), to the detriment of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte,126 because: 
 
The Court found that the State did not comply with its obligations under 
Articles 7(1) (Right to Personal Liberty and Security) and 7(5) (Right to 
Be Promptly Brought Before a Judge and Right to a Trial Within 
Reasonable Time) for several reasons.127 
 
Article 7(1) (Right to Personal Liberty and Security) guarantees the 
right to personal liberty and security.128 This right may be undermined 
only when the law expressly permits, such as when an individual 
violates an enumerated law that allows the State to deprive an 
individual of his personal liberty and security.129 State agents must find 
an individual guilty of a felony, and obtain a written arrest warrant to 
 
	   120.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  67-­‐68.	  	  
	   121.	   Id.	  ¶	  67.	  	  
	   122.	   Id.	  ¶	  68.	  	  
	   123.	   Id.	  	  
	   124.	   Id.	  	  
	   125.	   Id.	  ¶	  71.	  	  
	   126.	   Id.	  ¶	  92.	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  indicate	  that	  these	  violations	  were	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  
1(1)	  (Obligation	  to	  Respect	  Rights)	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
	   127.	   See	  id.	  ¶¶	  81-­‐92.	  
	   128.	   Id.	  ¶	  83.	  	  
	   129.	   See	  id.	  ¶	  85.	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detain any individual,130 except where terrorist acts are alleged.131 
DIRCOTE arrested Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte without 
obtaining a warrant and without finding them guilty of felonies.132 The 
State claimed to arrest Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte 
under suspicion of terrorism.133 When the Court requested that the State 
provide it with detention warrants or other documents that would 
permit the State to detain the victims pursuant to specific allegations of 
terrorist acts, the State failed to specify any allegations.134 Thus, the 
State deprived Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte of their right 
to personal liberty and security beyond the scope of exceptions 
permitted by law.135 
 
Article 7(5) (Right to Be Promptly Brought Before a Judge and Right to 
a Trial Within Reasonable Time) guarantees that a detained individual 
be brought promptly before a judge and receive a trial within a 
reasonable time after his or her detention.136 In instances of suspected 
terrorist acts, the State’s Constitution permits the State to detain 
individuals for up to fifteen days before sending an individual to the 
appropriate judicial body.137 The State did not refer Mr. Ugarte Rivera 
and Mr. Durand Ugarte to judicial agencies until eighteen and 
seventeen days, respectively, after they were detained.138 Thus, the State 
violated Article 7(5) (Right to Be Promptly Brought Before a Judge and 
Right to a Trial Within Reasonable Time) to the detriment of Mr. Ugarte 
Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte where it failed to bring either of them 
before a judge within the applicable time frame set forth in the State’s 
Constitution.139 
 
Articles 7(6) (Right to Recourse Before a Competent Court), 25(1) 
(Right of Recourse Before a Competent Court), and 27(2) (Suspension 
of Guarantees), to the detriment of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand 
Ugarte,140 because: 
 
	   130.	   Id.	  ¶	  90.	  	  
	   131.	   Id.	  ¶	  91.	  	  
	   132.	   Id.	  ¶	  85.	  	  
	   133.	   Id.	  ¶	  87.	  
	   134.	   Id.	  	  
	   135.	   Id.	  ¶	  89.	  	  
	   136.	   Id.	  ¶	  83.	  	  
	   137.	   Id.	  ¶	  90.	  	  
	   138.	   Id.	  ¶	  91.	  	  
	   139.	   Id.	  	  
	   140.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  106,	  110.	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  indicate	  that	  these	  violations	  were	  in	  relation	  to	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The Court found that habeas corpus recourse was the best means to 
determine the whereabouts of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand 
Ugarte.141 The Court also found that while the State did not de jure 
prohibit access to habeas corpus recourse by El Frontón detainees’ 
relatives, the State de facto prohibited habeas corpus recourse where it 
declared exclusive military jurisdiction over the province where the 
prison was located.142 By declaring military jurisdiction over El 
Frontón during the state of emergency, which prohibited the entrance of 
judges into the prison to investigate prisoners’ whereabouts, the State 
thus prevented the exercise of the essential function of the habeas 
corpus recourse.143 
 
Article 7(6) (Right to Recourse Before a Competent Court) guarantees 
the individual the right to recourse before a court in order to determine 
the lawfulness of the individual’s arrest or detention, and to require the 
individual’s release when the individual’s arrest or detention is 
unlawful.144 For a court to determine whether Mr. Ugarte Rivera and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte’s detention was lawful first requires a court to 
determine their whereabouts.145 Contrary to the First Instruction Court 
of Callao’s finding and subsequent courts’ affirmations that Ms. Ugarte 
Rivera’s lacked a basis for seeking habeas corpus recourse,146 the Court 
found that habeas corpus was the appropriate recourse in this 
instance.147 Thus, by both denying the habeas corpus petition as 
unfounded,148 and by preventing the possibility for a habeas corpus 
investigation to take place,149 the State violated Mr. Ugarte Rivera’s 
and Mr. Durand Ugarte’s rights to recourse before a court to determine 
the lawfulness of their detention in violation of Article 7(6) (Right to 
Have Recourse Before a Competent Court).150 
 
Article 25(1) (Right of Recourse Before a Competent Court) guarantees 
 
Article	  1(1)	  (Obligation	  to	  Respect	  Rights)	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
	   141.	   Id.	  ¶	  100.	  	  
	   142.	   Id.	  ¶	  93(d).	  	  
	   143.	   Id.	  ¶	  100.	  	  
	   144.	   Id.	  ¶	  96.	  	  
	   145.	   See	  generally	  id.	  ¶¶	  101-­‐103.	  	  
	   146.	   Id.	  ¶	  104.	  	  
	   147.	   Id.	  ¶	  100.	  	  
	   148.	   Id.	  	  
	   149.	   Id.	  ¶	  100.	  	  
	   150.	   Id.	  ¶	  110.	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the individual’s right to prompt and effective recourse when the 
individual’s fundamental rights have been violated, even when the 
individual’s rights are violated by those acting within the scope of their 
official duties.151 Habeas corpus was the ideal recourse to identify the 
whereabouts of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte.152 Because 
the State rendered the habeas corpus recourse effectively impossible 
through its declaration of exclusive military jurisdiction over El 
Frontón,153 the State thus prevented prompt and effective recourse to the 
detriment of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte after their 
fundamental rights had been violated, in violation of Article 25(1) 
(Right of Recourse Before a Competent Court).154 
 
The Court noted, furthermore, that the State is not immune from 
violating its obligations under the American Convention despite 
provisions set forth in Article 27(2) (Suspension of Guarantees).155 
Article 27(2) allows the State to take measures that run contrary to its 
obligations under the American Convention in cases of war, public 
danger, or other threatening situations that pose danger to the security 
of the State, with certain exceptions that do not include Articles 25(1) 
(Right of Recourse Before a Competent Court) and 7(6) (Right to 
Recourse Before a Competent Court).156 This consent, however, is valid 
only for the duration and extent necessitated by the circumstances that 
threaten the State’s security.157 State actions beyond those limits are 
violations of law.158 The Court has held that the nonexistence of an 
effective recourse against Convention violations surpasses the extent of 
necessary measures permitted during such emergency situations.159 The 
State is thus not exempt under, but is instead in violation of, Article 
27(2) (Suspension of Guarantees), by suspending the habeas corpus 
recourse.160 
 
Articles 8(1) (Right to a Hearing Within a Reasonable Time by a 
Competent and Independent Tribunal) and 25(1) (Right of Recourse 
 
	   151.	   Id.	  ¶	  95.	  	  
	   152.	   Id.	  ¶	  93(d).	  
	   153.	   Id.	  ¶	  100.	  	  
	   154.	   Id.	  ¶	  131.	  	  
	   155.	   See	  id.	  ¶¶	  99-­‐100.	  	  
	   156.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  97(1)-­‐(2).	  	  
	   157.	   Id.	  ¶	  97(1).	  
	   158.	   Id.	  ¶	  99.	  	  
	   159.	   Id.	  ¶	  102.	  
	   160.	   Id.	  ¶	  93(e).	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Before a Competent Court), to the detriment of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte and their relatives161 because: 
 
The Court found that the military tribunals through which the habeas 
corpus petitions on behalf of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand 
Ugarte were adjudicated did not constitute competent, independent 
tribunals for purposes of Articles 8(1) (Right to a Hearing Within a 
Reasonable Time by a Competent and Independent Tribunal) and 25(1) 
(Right of Recourse Before a Competent Court).162 
 
Article 8(1) (Right to a Hearing Within a Reasonable Time by a 
Competent and Independent Tribunal) guarantees the right to a hearing 
before a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal within a 
reasonable time.163 Article 25(1) (Right of Recourse Before a Competent 
Court) guarantees the individual the right to prompt and effective 
recourse when the individual’s fundamental rights have been violated, 
even when the individual’s rights are violated by those acting within the 
scope of their official duties.164 The State delegated the duty to 
investigate the riot suppression efforts at El Frontón to military 
courts.165 Because military courts consist of active-duty members of the 
armed forces, however, and because the investigation for which the 
military court was charged with undertaking concerned potential 
misconduct by military members themselves,166 the military court did 
not constitute an independent, impartial tribunal.167 Furthermore, 
Article 8 (Right to a Fair Trial) and 25 (Right to Judicial Protection) 
must be read to include the victims’ relatives as well as the victims 
themselves whose recourse is denied.168 Thus, the State violated Articles 
8(1) (Right to a Hearing Within Reasonable Time by a Competent and 
Independent Tribunal) and 25(1) (Right of Recourse Before a 
Competent Court) to the detriment of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte as well as their relatives.169 
 
 
	   161.	   Id.	  ¶	  131.	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  indicate	  that	  these	  violations	  were	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  
1(1)	  (Obligation	  to	  Respect	  Rights)	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
	   162.	   Id.	  ¶	  125.	  	  
	   163.	   Id.	  ¶	  113.	  	  
	   164.	   Id.	  ¶	  114.	  	  
	   165.	   Id.	  ¶	  119.	  	  
	   166.	   Id.	  ¶	  126.	  	  
	   167.	   Id.	  	  
	   168.	   Id.	  ¶	  128.	  	  
	   169.	   Id.	  ¶	  131.	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The general obligations of Articles 1(1) (Obligation to Respect 
Rights) and 2 (Obligation to Give Domestic Legal Effect to Rights), to 
the detriment of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte,170 because: 
 
The Court found that by violating American Convention Articles 4(1) 
(Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life), 7(1) (Right to Personal 
Liberty and Security), 7(5) (Right to Be Promptly Brought Before a 
Judge and Right to a Trial Within Reasonable Time), 7(6) (Right to 
Recourse Before a Competent Court), 8(1) (Right to a Hearing Within a 
Reasonable Time by a Competent and Independent Tribunal) and 25(1) 
(Right of Recourse Before a Competent Court), the State impliedly 
violated the general rights and freedoms guaranteed by Article 1(1) 
(Obligation to Respect Rights).171 The Court also found that where the 
State failed to guarantee the rights stipulated in Article 1(1) and failed 
to adopt domestic legislative measures to attempt to give effect to those 
rights,172 the State also violated Article 2 (Obligation to Give Domestic 
Legal Effect to Rights) of the American Convention to the detriment of 
Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte.173 
 
The Court found by six votes against one that the State had not 
violated: 
 
Article 5(2) (Prohibition of Torture, and Cruel, Inhumane or 
Degrading Treatment), to the detriment of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte,174 because: 
 
The Court did not have sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Ugarte 
Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte suffered acts of torture, cruel, 
inhumane, or degrading treatment by the State while detained at El 
Frontón.175 The Court may infer that because Mr. Durand Ugarte and 
Mr. Ugarte Rivera were detained at El Frontón the day of the riot 
suppression efforts, there was no possibility for their escape, and their 
whereabouts remain unknown, they are the victims of forced 
disappearances.176 The State also used disproportionate force against 
 
	   170.	   Id.	  ¶	  139.	  	  
	   171.	   Id.	  ¶	  138.	  	  
	   172.	   Id.	  	  
	   173.	   Id.	  ¶	  139.	  	  
	   174.	   Id.	  ¶	  80.	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  indicate	  that	  this	  violation	  was	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  1(1)	  
(Obligation	  to	  Respect	  Rights)	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
	   175.	   Id.	  ¶	  79.	  	  
	   176.	   Id.	  ¶¶	  79(b),	  (d).	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the prisoners at El Frontón where Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand 
Ugarte were detained.177 Forced disappearance and disproportionate 
and unjustified use of force alone, however, are insufficient to infer that 
victims necessarily suffer acts of torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading 
treatment.178 The Court thus cannot conclude that Mr. Ugarte Rivera 
and Mr. Durand Ugarte suffered such treatment in violation of Article 
5(2) (Prohibition of Torture, and Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading 
Treatment) of the Convention.179 
C. Dissenting and Concurring Opinions 
1. Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge De Roux Rengifo 
Judge De Roux Rengifo opposed the majority Court’s finding that 
it could not infer, from the victims’ forced disappearances and 
subjection to disproportionate force alone, that the State subjected 
Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte to the treatment prohibited 
by Article 5(2) (Prohibition of Torture, and Cruel, Inhumane or 
Degrading Treatment).180  
Judge De Roux Rengifo noted that the Court recently stated three 
criteria for evaluating evidence.181 First, the Court retains flexibility to 
assess evidence using logic and experience.182 Second, the Court may 
utilize circumstantial evidence to make findings as long as such 
evidence yields sound conclusions.183 Third, with regard to human 
rights violations, a State may not base its defense on the grounds that 
plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence, since the State is often 
the gatekeeper of the very evidence that plaintiffs seek to gather.184 
Judge De Roux Rengifo asserted that the Court did not follow these 
criteria in the present case.185 
Judge De Roux Rengifo agreed with the Court that the Court 
cannot infer that the State’s disproportionate use of force alone 
constitutes cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment against the 
 
	   177.	   Id.	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  79.	  	  
	   178.	   Id.	  	  
	   179.	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victims.186 Employing the Court’s previously stated criteria, however, 
Judge De Roux Rengifo asserted that the State’s disproportionate use of 
force, along with the type of disproportionate force it used, should allow 
the Court to infer how the victims were affected by such force.187 
Evidence demonstrates an ample time period between the demolition of 
the Blue Pavilion and most of the inmates’ times of death.188 This 
circumstantial evidence may lead to a judgment that inmates suffered 
severely during this time, considering the physical anguish from the 
type of force used, as well as the mental anguish that likely resulted 
from the inmates’ knowledge that escaping was impossible.189 Judge De 
Roux Rengifo thus asserted that it may be concluded with high 
probability that Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte suffered 
severe mental and physical anguish between the time of the riot 
suppression efforts and the time of their deaths so as to amount to the 
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment prohibited by Article 5(2) 
(Prohibition of Torture, and Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading 
Treatment).190 
IV. REPARATIONS 
The Court ruled unanimously that the State had the following 
obligations: 
A. Specific Performance (Measures of Satisfaction and Non-
Repetition Guarantee) 
1. Publish the Court’s Judgment 
The Court indicated that the State shall issue an Executive Decree 
that the El Peruano newspaper, as well as other media outlets, publish 
the Court’s August 16, 2000 Judgment.191 
2. Publically Apologize 
The Court indicated that the State’s Executive Decree for 
publication of the Court’s Judgment, in the El Peruano newspaper, must 
include a public apology to Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte 
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for the “grievous injuries caused,” as well as the State’s confirmation 
that similar events will never recur.192 
3. Investigate and Punish 
The Court indicated that the State must investigate and punish all 
persons responsible for the harm caused to the thirty murdered victims, 
including Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte, in the El Frontón 
riot suppression efforts.193  
The Court also indicated that the State must undertake necessary 
measures to locate and identify the remains of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and 
Mr. Durand Ugarte.194 The State must deliver the remains to the 
victims’ next of kin.195 
B. Compensation 
The Court awarded the following amounts: 
1. Pecuniary Damages 
The Court awarded a compensatory payment of $125,000 as a 
result of damages caused to Mr. Ugarte Rivera, Mr. Durand Ugarte, and 
their relatives.196 The sum shall be divided equally197 to victims’ 
beneficiaries, Ms. Virginia Bonifacia Ugarte Rivera de Durand, 
Mr. Durand, and Nolberto Durand Vargas, sister and brother-in-law, 
respectively, to Mr. Ugarte Rivera, and parents of Mr. Durand Ugarte.198 
The State must make partial payment of the sum within the current 
fiscal year and complete the payment during the second quarter of the 
next fiscal year.199 
The State must also pay for a portion of the construction costs of 
the beneficiaries’ residence.200 
 
2. Non-Pecun iary Damages 
The State must cover the lifetime health care costs, including 
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medications, of the beneficiaries.201 
The State must cover all future costs associated with psychological 
health services as required by the beneficiaries.202 
3. Costs and Expenses 
[None] 
4. Total Compensation (including Costs and Expenses ordered): 
$125,000203 
C. Deadlines 
The State must provide the Court with a report on its performance 
of reparations obligations within six months of the Court’s Reparations 
and Costs Judgment issued December 3, 2001.204 
V. INTERPRETATION AND REVISION OF JUDGMENT 
[None] 
VI. COMPLIANCE AND FOLLOW-UP 
June 12, 2002: The State complied with its obligation to deliver partial 
payment of the $125,000 Judgment ordered by the Court to the 
beneficiaries of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte.205 As of this 
date, the State has paid eighty percent of the judgment to the 
beneficiaries.206 
 
November 14, 2002: The State partially complied with its obligation to 
publish the Court’s August 16, 2000 judgment.207 The State published 
the judgment in the El Peruano newspaper, but did not publish the 
judgment in additional media outlets.208 
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November 22, 2002: The State fulfilled its obligation to publish a public 
apology for “grievous damage caused” to the victims an Executive 
Decree in El Peruano.209 
 
November 27, 2002: The Court reports that the State failed to comply 
with the Court’s judgment within the required time period for several of 
its obligations.210 The State failed to cover all health care and 
psychological services costs for the beneficiaries, as well as to partially 
cover the beneficiaries’ home construction costs.211 The State also failed 
to publish and circulate of the Court’s August 16, 2000 judgment in the 
El Peruano newspaper and other media outlets, and failed, by extension, 
to publish a public apology to the victims.212 Further, the State failed to 
investigate and punish the individuals responsible for all injury to the 
victims and to and advance the investigation of the murder of thirty 
individuals, including Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte.213 
Last, the State failed to undertake specific measures to identify the 
remains of Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte.214 
 
May 28, 2003: The State made its final payment to fulfill its obligation 
to pay $125,000 to victims’ beneficiaries.215 
 
June 24, 2004: The State complied with its obligation to identify and 
confer to his next of kin the remains of Mr. Durand Ugarte.216  The 
Office of the Special Prosecutor for Forced Disappearances had 
conducted exhumations in several public cemeteries, where it was able 
to identify Mr. Durand Ugarte’s remains. After several exhumations in 
the same cemeteries, however, the remains of Mr. Ugarte Rivera had 
not been found.217 
 
April 18, 2006: The State had yet to comply with its obligation to 
identify the remains of Mr. Ugarte Rivera, but continued its 
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investigation to do so.218 
 
August 5, 2008: The State implemented various measures through 
which to investigate and punish the individuals responsible for victims’ 
injuries.219 Several investigative bodies, such as the Office of the 
Special Prosecutor for Forced Disappearances, the Supreme Council of 
Military Justice, the Attorney General, and the Third Criminal Chamber 
initiated investigations.220 The Court required, however, that the State 
collect and provide the Court with further information on the status of 
its obligation to investigate and punish those responsible for the 
grievances to Mr. Ugarte Rivera and Mr. Durand Ugarte.221  
The State had still not complied with its obligation to identify the 
remains of Mr. Ugarte Rivera.222 The Court demanded that the State 
continue its investigation to locate Mr. Ugarte Rivera’s remains and 
update the Court on measures it has taken in order for the Court to 
assess the State’s compliance with this obligation.223 
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3. Provisional Measures 
[None] 
 
4. Compliance Monitoring 
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, 
Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 27, 2002).224 
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